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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Are the statutory language and legislative history of
section 118 of the Clean Air Act sufficiently clear and une-
quivocal to satisfy the high standard required to constitute
a valid waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity
from punitive civil penalties?
2. Does a party that is not claiming inadequate consider-
ation of environmental factors as its injury in fact have
standing to sue under NEPA, and, if so, is there federal
subject matter jurisdiction to hear such a claim?
3. Is an Environmental Impact Statement that is pre-
pared voluntarily and after proper filing of an unchal-
lenged Finding of No Significant Impact subject to judicial
review?
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
Civ. No. 94-214
STATE OF NEW UNION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
SUNPEACE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON APPEAL FROM
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW UNION,
THE HONORABLE R. N. REMUS, JUDGE
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over appeals
arising from final decisions of the District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Union because that District is within the Twelfth
Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Foundation 1993). Interpretation
of the Clean Air Act (CAA) is a federal question over which
this Court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (Foundation 1993). While the District Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Sunpeace's claim,
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this Court has proper jurisdiction for the purpose of review-
ing that jurisdictional determination. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de
novo as pure matters of law, where an appellate court may
exercise its independent judgment to discern the intent of the
legislature. See Estate of Holl v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d
1437, 1438 (10th Cir. 1992). A District Court's decision re-
garding subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. Kun-
kel v. Continental Casualty Company, 866 F.2d 1269, 1273
(10th Cir. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
On April 27, 1993, the New Union Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality (NUDEQ) assessed $300,000 in fines
against the United States Department of the Interior (DOI)
for alleged violations of the New Union Clean Air Act (NU-
CAA) at its Coal Research Activity (CRACT) in Cathertown,
New Union. (T.R. 2-3.) Although DOI claimed sovereign im-
munity from NUCAA and refused to pay the fines, it did
make plans to bring CRACT into compliance with NUCAA.
(T.R. 3.) Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), DOI prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA)
and filed a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) on the
proposed project. (T.R. 4.) Although not required by NEPA
to do so, DOI also prepared an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) regarding these same changes. (T.R. 4.)
Sunpeace filed a complaint against DOI in the United
States District Court for the District of New Union under
NEPA and the Administrative Policy Act (APA) alleging de-
fects in the EIS. (T.R. 4.) The State of New Union (New
Union) later filed suit in the same court to enforce and collect
the fines levied against DOI. (T.R. 4.) The two actions were
consolidated for decision. (T.R. 4.) Following a bench trial,
the Honorable R.N. Remus, Judge, entered verdicts against
1995] 643
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DOI on both claims on April 23, 1994. (T.R. 5, 6.) DOI ap-
peals the entirety of the District Court's decision. (T.R. 1.)
Statement of Facts
DOI owns and operates CRACT, a research plant focus-
ing on ways to make coal mining more efficient and economi-
cal, in Cathertown, New Union. (T.R. 2.) CRACT employs
800 federal workers and is the principal employer in
Cathertown. (T.R. 2.) CRACT helps the coal industry, which
employs 20% of the New Union work force, by sharing the
results of its research. (T.R. 2.) CRACT began its "Improved
Coal Transport Experiment" (ICTE) in 1985. (T.R. 3.) A by-
product of ICTE is a large amount of particulate matter es-
caping into the air. (T.R. 3.)
On September 30, 1989, NUDEQ inspected and cited the
ICTE program for violating the standards for particulate
matter of the NUCAA, an authorized state program under
CAA. (T.R. 3.) The only action taken against the facility was
a letter written by the NUDEQ administrator to CRACT ex-
plaining the NUCAA standards and asserting jurisdiction to
regulate the facility. (T.R. 3.) NUDEQ did not assess penal-
ties. (T.R. 3.) CRACT received, but did not answer, the let-
ter. (T.R. 3.)
The ICTE program had not changed when NUDEQ in-
spected the facility on April 27, 1993. (T.R. 3.) This time, the
NUDEQ Administrator authorized the inspectors to assess
$300,000 in civil penalties in accordance with NUCAA. (T.R.
3.) CRACT acknowledged its obligation to comply substan-
tively with NUCAA standards, but denied liability for civil
penalties because the federal government had not waived
sovereign immunity. (T.R. 3.) In order to comply with NU-
CAA, CRACT promised to build a hangar and baghouse filter,
at a cost of $3,000,000 to remove particulate matter from
ICTE. (T.R. 3.) Before an EA was completed, Sunpeace be-
gan a media campaign to criticize ICTE and suggest both it
and the entire CRACT facility be closed. (T.R. 3.)
CRACT completed an EA and found that no significant
impact would result from any operation of the facility which
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/3
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complied with NUCAA standards. (T.R. 4.) CRACT pub-
lished the FONSI in the Federal Register on June 26, 1993,
along with an announcement that the facility would volunta-
rily complete an EIS on the ICTE program because of the con-
troversy surrounding the hangar and baghouse construction.
(T.R. 4.) CRACT deferred construction on the hangar and
baghouse until an expedited Record of Decision was fied.
(T.R. 4.) Until that decision, the ICTE program would con-
tinue at the reduced volume in compliance with NUCAA.
(T.R. 4.)
The Draft EIS, published in December, 1993, explored
two alternatives: (1) ICTE operations carried on at the origi-
nal volume, but with the construction of the hangar and
baghouse; and (2) ICTE operations at the reduced volume
which complied with NUCAA. (T.R. 4.) Sunpeace submitted
written comments during the comment period arguing the
EIS had to include an analysis of the "no action" alternative,
which would be elimination of the ICTE program. (T.R. 4.)
CRACT responded by saying that issue was beyond the scope
and requirements of this EIS. (T.R. 4.) CRACT has now pub-
lished a Final EIS and Record of Decision selecting the high-
paced alternative with the hangar and baghouse. (T.R. 4.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the judgment of the District
Court on the issue of sovereign immunity under CAA. The
lower court erred because the statutory language and legisla-
tive intent of section 118 of CAA is not clear enough with re-
gard to punitive civil penalties to meet the high standard for
finding a waiver of sovereign immunity.
This Court should dismiss Sunpeace's action seeking ju-
dicial review of the EIS because Sunpeace lacks standing to
bring its claim under NEPA. Alternatively, this Court should
remand the case with instructions to dismiss because the Dis-
trict Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under either
NEPA or APA to hear Sunpeace's claim.
If this Court decides to reach the merits of Sunpeace's
claim, it should reverse the judgment of the District Court on
1995] 645
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the issue of judicial review of a voluntary EIS. The lower
court erred because the EIS was prepared after CRACT had
fully complied with NEPA and because the EIS is outside the
scope of NEPA.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BECAUSE THE
STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE
INTENT OF SECTION 118 OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
IS NOT CLEAR ENOUGH WITH REGARD TO
PUNITIVE CIVIL PENALTIES TO MEET THE HIGH
STANDARD FOR FINDING A WAIVER OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.
In order for New Union to assess civil penalties against
CRACT, this Court must find that the United States waived
sovereign immunity. Absent the consent of Congress, states
do not possess the power to tax or otherwise to impose fees or
fines upon federal facilities. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 427-29 (1819). The waiver of sovereign immu-
nity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally ex-
pressed." United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). The
United States Supreme Court has also held that a court must
strictly construe a waiver in favor of the sovereign and may
not extend it beyond the language of the statute. Ruckel-
shaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686 (1983). The waiver
involved in this case, section 118 of the CAA, must meet an
even higher standard because waivers of sovereign immunity
affecting the federal treasury are especially subject to narrow
construction. United States v. Air Pollution Control Bd. of the
Tennessee Dep't of Health and Environment, No. 3:88-1030,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343, at *12 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 11,
1990); see Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380,
385 (1947). Not only is section 118 subject to especially nar-
row construction, but a presumption exists against the
United States exposure to state fines or penalties, even where
a federal statute generally subjects a federal facility to state
law. Air Pollution Control Bd., No. 3:88-1030, 1990 U.S.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/3
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Dist. LEXIS 8343, at *13; see Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v.
Ault, 256 U.S. 554, 563-65 (1921).
Therefore, the difficult standard for finding a waiver of
sovereign immunity should be even more strict in this partic-
ular case. Any penalty assessed against CRACT would di-
rectly impact the federal treasury since CRACT is a federally
funded project. (T.R. 2.) Moreover, since the present case in-
volves civil penalties assessed by New Union, the waiver lan-
guage in section 118(a), upon which New Union relies, must
be exceptionally clear in order to overcome the presumption
against exposing the United States to state penalties.
A. The plain language of section 118(a) does not clearly
and unequivocally waive sovereign immunity with
respect to punitive civil penalties.
Section 118(a) of the CAA subjects federal facilities to
state regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (West 1993); see Ap-
pendix A for the complete text of section 118(a). The lan-
guage in section 118 requires federal facilities to comply with
the substantive and procedural requirements of the CAA.
However, the language does not clearly waive immunity with
respect to punitive civil penalties. This Court must construe
the waiver especially narrowly and should read the phrase
"process and sanctions," which is mentioned twice in 118(a),
to apply only to coercive penalties imposed in order to force
federal facilities to comply with state standards. The
Supreme Court described coercive penalties as those imposed
to induce compliance with injunctions or other judicial orders
designed to modify behavior prospectively. Department of
Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1632 (1992). The Supreme
Court defined punitive fines as those "to punish past viola-
tions." Id.
This Court should interpret section i18 to include only
coercive penalties because the term "requirements" cannot
encompass civil penalties, the words "process" and "sanction"
must be read together, and such a reading would be consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of similar lan-
guage in the Clean Water Act (CWA).
19951 647
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1. The term "requirements" cannot include punitive
civil penalties.
Section 118(a) subjects federal facilities to "all Federal,
State, interstate, and local requirements .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 7418(a). The standard definition of "requirement" is "some-
thing called for or demanded: a requisite or essential condi-
tion .... " Webster's Third New International Dictionary at
1929 (3d ed. 1981). Using this definition, this Court should
read that word as applying only to standards or processes
which federal facilities must meet in order to operate within
the state. Any penalty assessment is merely a consequence of
failing to comply with the essential conditions, namely the
state's regulations.
This court should not read the term "requirements" to in-
clude any of the enforcement penalties included in the CAA.
A well-known canon of statutory interpretation states that
courts "must avoid statutory interpretation that renders any
section superfluous and does not give effect to all of the words
used by Congress." In re Oxborrow, 913 F.2d 751, 754 (9th
Cir. 1990). If the term "requirements" included penalties, the
phrase "process and sanctions," located at the end of the list
of provisions with which federal facilities must comply, would
be rendered superfluous.
Although this Court has not addressed the issue, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in California v. Wal-
ters, 751 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1984), supports the exclusion of
civil penalties from the term requirement. The Walters Court
decided that "requirements" as used in the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA), did not encompass criminal
penalties. Id. at 978. The relevant waiver provision in RCRA
is similar to the waiver in CAA and reads:
Each department, agency, instrumentality of the execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Gov-
ernment . . . shall be subject to, and comply with, all
Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, both
substantive and procedural (including any requirement for
permits or reporting or any provisions for injunctive relief
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/3
TWELFTH CIRCUIT
and such sanctions as may be imposed by a court to enforce
such relief).
42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (West 1993). The Ninth Circuit did not
have to address the issue of whether civil penalties were in-
cluded in the phrase "all requirements." However, the rea-
soning the court used to reach its decision on criminal
penalties would apply to punitive civil penalties as well. The
court held that "[c]riminal sanctions... are not a 'require-
ment' of state law within the meaning of section 6961, but
rather the means by which the standards, permits, and re-
porting duties are enforced." Walters, 751 F.2d at 978. Puni-
tive civil penalties are also a means to enforce state
standards and are, therefore, indistinguishable from criminal
penalties.
The Supreme Court also addressed the issue in deciding
that CWA and RCRA did not waive sovereign immunity for
punitive civil penalties. Department of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at
1631. The Court stated "that 'all... requirements' 'can be
reasonably interpreted as including substantive standards
and the means for implementing those standards, but exclud-
ing punitive measures.'" Id. at 1639-40 (quoting Mitzelfelt v.
Department of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1295 (10th Cir.
1990)).
2. The words "process and sanction" must be read
together to apply only to coercive civil penalties.
The United States also did not waive sovereign immunity
with respect to punitive civil penalties through the phrase
"process and sanctions." The canons of construction require
those words be read together and to only apply to coercive
penalties.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has
said that courts "must enforce the statute 'according to its
terms' and pursuant to the reasonable interpretation 'man-
dated by [its] grammatical structure.'" United States v.
Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting United
States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)). The
grammar of the statute mandates that the words "process"
1995] 649
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and "sanctions" be read as one phrase because of the use of
the conjunction "and" before their inclusion in the list of pro-
visions with which federal facilities must comply. The first
use of the words is at the end of the list which reads "[e]ach
department, agency, and instrumentality of... the Federal
Government... shall be subject to, and comply with, all Fed-
eral, State, interstate, and local requirements, administra-
tive authority, and process and sanctions respecting the
control and abatement of air pollution . . . ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7418(a) (emphasis added). Had the words "process" and
"sanctions" been meant to refer to separate, unrelated as-
pects of CAA, Congress would not have used a conjunction
both before and after the word "process." By using that con-
junction, Congress has connected the word "process" to the
word "sanctions" and then also attached that phrase as a
whole to the list which includes local requirements and ad-
ministrative authority.
The interpretation that "process" and "sanctions" are to
be read together is further reinforced by the next lines of sec-
tion 118 which read:
The preceding sentence shall apply (A) to any requirement
whether substantive or procedural (including any record-
keeping or reporting requirement, any requirement re-
specting permits and any other requirement whatsoever),
(B) to any requirement to pay a fee or charge imposed by
any State or local agency to defray the costs of its air pollu-
tion regulatory program, (C) to the exercise of any Federal,
State, or local administrative authority, and (D) to any pro-
cess and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or
local courts, or in any other manner.
Id. This sentence separates each element in the list and ex-
plains that responsibility further. In fact, in the first list, the
term requirement is not divided between the substantive and
procedural aspects and the requirement of federal facilities to
pay fees. The first list included both of those requirements in
one word, but divides them into their own subletter in ex-
panding on their meaning. The phrase "process and sanc-
tion" is explained together in its own lettered division. Had
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the words been meant to be unrelated, Congress would have
given each term its own lettered division, as it did with the
different meanings of the term requirements (i.e., fees and
substantive and procedural requirements). Therefore, the
words "process and sanctions" must be related and consid-
ered one phrase.
3. The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase
"process and sanctions" in the Clean Water Act
to refer to only coercive civil penalties.
The result of reading "process" and "sanctions" together
is that they can only refer to coercive penalties. The Supreme
Court has already interpreted almost identical language in
CWA, which reads:
[Elach department, agency, or instrumentality of the...
Federal Government... shall be subject to, and comply
with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,
administrative authority, and process and sanctions re-
specting the control and abatement of water pollution in
the same manner ... as any nongovernmental entity....
The preceding sentence shall apply ... (C) to any process
and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local
courts or in any other manner.
33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (West 1993). The Supreme Court found
that the phrase "process and sanctions" applied only to coer-
cive penalties. Department of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1637.
In analyzing the waiver, the Supreme Court noted three
significant points. The first was the "three manifestations of
governmental power to which the United States is subjected:
substantive and procedural requirements; administrative
authority; and 'process and sanctions,' whether 'enforced' in
courts or otherwise." Id. The second important point the
Court stressed was the "conjunction of 'sanction[s]' not with
the substantive 'requirements,' but with 'process,' in each of
the two instances in which 'sanctions' appears.' Trocess' nor-
mally refers to the procedure and mechanics of adjudication
and the enforcement of decrees or orders that the adjudica-
tory process finally provides." Id. The final important lan-
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guage in the waiver is "the statute's reference to 'process and
sanctions' as 'enforced' in courts or otherwise." Id. From this
analysis, the Supreme Court concluded "the very fact, then,
that the text speaks of sanctions in the context of enforcing
'process' as distinct from substantive 'requirements' is a good
reason to infer that Congress was using 'sanction' in its coer-
cive sense, to the exclusion of punitive fines." Id.
The analysis and conclusions of the Supreme Court
should be applied to the waiver provision in the CAA. First,
the language in the two waiver provisions referring to process
and sanctions is identical. Therefore, the three aspects of the
language which the Supreme Court used to conclude that
"process and sanctions" referred only to coercive fines are also
present in the CAA waiver. First, since the term "sanction"
must be read in conjunction with the word "process," that
phrase is separate from the substantive aspects of CAA which
the term "requirements" encompass. Second, the statute
gives no indication that the term "process" should mean any-
thing different from the usual usage which the Supreme
Court described. Finally, section 118(a)(D) of CAA speaks of
sanctions in the context of enforcing process instead of sub-
stantive requirements. Since the same language and context
appear in both CAA and CWA, the Supreme Court's reason-
ing and conclusion concerning punitive civil penalties should
control in the present case.
B. Legislative history does not clearly prove that Congress
intended to waive sovereign immunity with respect to
civil penalties.
The legislative history on section 118 of CAA is ambigu-
ous with regard to civil penalties and therefore, cannot be
considered conclusive on the issue. The reports on section
118 indicate that the House of Representatives (House) did
intend to waive immunity for all civil penalties. The Senate
reports, however, are clear only with regard to coercive civil
penalties.
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One House Report indicates that the committee amend-
ing CAA intended to waive immunity for civil penalties. The
committee proposal stated:
The amendment is also intended to resolve any question
about the sanctions to which noncomplying Federal agen-
cies, facilities, officers, employees, or agents may be sub-
ject. The applicable sanctions are to be the same for
Federal facilities and personnel as for privately owned pol-
lution sources and for the owners and operators thereof.
This means that Federal facilities and agencies may be
subject to injunctive relief (and criminal or civil contempt
citations to enforce any such injunction), to civil or crimi-
nal penalties, and to delayed compliance penalties.
H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 200 (1977). The
House made it clear that it intended to include both coercive
and punitive civil penalties.
The Senate history, on the other hand, is only clear with
respect to coercive civil penalties. The Senate report states:
Section 118 is amended to specify that.., a Federal facility
is subject to any Federal, State, and local requirement, re-
specting the control and abatement of air pollution, both
substantive and procedural, to the same extent as any per-
son is subject to these requirements. This includes, but is
not limited to, requirements to obtain operating and con-
struction permits, reporting and monitoring requirements,
any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions im-
posed by a court to enforce such relief, and the payment of
reasonable service charges.
S. Rep. No. 127, 95th Congress, 1st Sess. 58 (1977) (emphasis
added). This sentence demonstrates that the Senate only in-
tended coercive penalties to be enforceable against federal
facilities.
Congress did adopt the House version of the amendment,
but the Conference Report is also ambiguous as to whether
federal facilities are liable for punitive civil penalties. The
Conference Report states:
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The Senate concurs in the House provision with the
amendments ... The conferees intend, by adopting the
House amendment, to require compliance with all proce-
dural and substantive requirements, to authorize States to
sue Federal facilities in State courts, and to subject such
facilities to State sanctions.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1977), re-
printed in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1517-1518.
Under the strict requirement established to find . a
waiver, this Court can only read this report to include the
Senate's perception of civil penalties, namely those used to
coerce the federal government into compliance. This Court is
limited to this reading by the last two phrases of the report
which "authorize States to sue Federal facilities in State
courts, and to subject such facilities to State sanctions." Id.
By using the word "such" to modify "facilities," those words
can only refer to the federal facilities mentioned in the pre-
ceding clause, namely those sued in state court. Therefore,
the conference report does not include all types of civil penal-
ties. For instance, the civil penalty involved in the present
case, a penalty assessed by the Administrator of a state pro-
gram, would not be covered by the conference report because
the state never sued the federal facility. The only type of civil
penalty which would fit the description in the conference re-
port is a penalty assessed in order to enforce some judicial
process, such as an injunction, which would have resulted
from the federal facility being sued by the state to comply
with state requirements.
The legislative history of CAA is ambiguous with regards
to punitive civil penalties. The only clear intent which can be
derived from the history is that Congress wanted to subject
federal facilities to coercive civil penalties. Anything beyond
that is an inference and therefore does not meet the high
standard necessary to find a waiver.
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/3
TWELFTH CIRCUIT
C. Public policy dictates a finding that the United States
did not waive sovereign immunity for civil penalties.
This Court should also find that the United States did
not waive sovereign immunity with respect to civil penalties
for public policy reasons. First, subjecting federal facilities to
civil penalties would limit valuable programs, some of which
actually reduce air pollution. Second, the imposition of these
fines could lead to unequal enforcement against the
government.
1. The imposition of punitive fines would be counter-
productive.
Any punitive fine would decrease the ftnding available
for important government projects. Such a situation could
actually frustrate the intent of CAA. The present case is a
perfect example of this unacceptable result. One project at
the CRACT facility researches methods to burn coal more
cleanly. (T.R. 2.) The results of that research are then
shared with the coal industry. (T.R. 2.) Any limiting of such
research would be contrary to the intent of the CAA which is
"1) to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air re-
sources so as to promote the public health and welfare and
the productive capacity of its population; 2) to initiate and
accelerate a national research and development program to
achieve the prevention and control of air pollution .... " 42
U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1)-(2) (West 1993). Therefore, the assess-
ment of punitive fines against the government could be
counter-productive, as in this case, especially when the fed-
eral facility has already come into compliance with state re-
quirements. The fines would do nothing to improve air
quality and could limit important governmental projects.
2. Finding a waiver of sovereign immunity would lead
to unequal assessment of civil penalties against
the government.
States vary on the criteria which they use to determine
the amount of a civil penalty. See, e.g., N.Y. Envtl. Conserv.
Law § 71-2115 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1994); Cal. Health &
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Safety Code § 42403 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994). However,
many state's criteria are consistent with the assessment cri-
teria established in section 113(e)(1) of CAA. See, e.g., Iowa
Code § 455B.109 (1993). The relevant portion of section 113
reads:
[T]he Administrator, or court... shall take into considera-
tion (in addition to such other factors as justice may re-
quire) the size of the business, the economic impact of the
penalty on the business, the violator's full compliance his-
tory and good faith efforts to comply, the duration of the
violation.., payment of the violator of penalties previously
assessed for the same violation, the economic benefit of
noncompliance, and the seriousness of the violation.
42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (West 1993). Under these, or similar,
criteria, the government would almost always be assessed
penalties, and those penalties would often be as large as the
law would allow. For instance, the government is one of the
largest employers in the country and the economic impact of
any penalty would appear less on the government than on
any other business because of the size of the federal govern-
ment's budget. Therefore, these criteria would allow the
states to penalize the government more often than other busi-
nesses because of its ability to pay.
The Supreme Court has recognized the possibility of une-
qual administration of penalties against the government. In
Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981), the Supreme
Court examined the question of whether Congress had pro-
vided for jury trials in cases against the United States under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The Supreme
Court stated that "[i]t is not difficult to appreciate Congress'
reluctance to provide for jury trials against the United
States.... Congress expressed its concern that juries 'might
tend to be overly generous because of the virtually unlimited
ability of the Government to pay the verdict.'" Id. at 161 n.8
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 659, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953)).
The same rationale applies in the present case. State admin-
istrators might be more willing to assess civil penalties
against the government because the government will be able
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to pay them. Therefore, this Court should follow the
Supreme Court and prevent states from unequally assessing
civil penalties by preserving the government's sovereign im-
munity with respect to purely punitive civil penalties.
3. The unavailability of punitive civil penalties will
not harm the states' ability to enforce CAA's
requirements.
Other enforcement provisions in the amended version of
CAA are sufficient to ensure the compliance of federal facili-
ties. First, the state can issue an administrative order to re-
quire a federal facility to comply. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(a)(1)(B) (West 1993). Secondly, the states can sue the
federal facility for injunctive or declaratory relief. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(a). Under section 304(a) of CAA, a state, since it falls
within the definition of "person" in 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (West
1993), can file suit to have the federal court enforce any of the
state's standards or an order issued by the state with respect
to such standard or limitation. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). Finally,
since 1977, the federal government must comply with all pro-
cedural requirements, such as permit requirements and re-
cordkeeping. 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a). The Supreme Court
decided that federal facilities did not have to obtain state op-
erating permits in Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
Congress expressly overruled that decision by amending CAA
in 1977 to require federal facilities to obtain permits before
beginning operations. Therefore, the states still have proce-
dural safeguards, such as permit requirements, which allow
them to enforce their state regulations. Because of the proce-
dural safeguards, availability of injunctive and declaratory
relief, and other coercive penalties, limiting the availability of
punitive penalties will not frustrate the state's efforts to en-
force requirements against federal facilities.
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D. The incorporation of section 118 in the citizen suit
provision limits the recovery of civil penalties under
section 304 to those coercive in nature.
The Supreme Court has stated that the adoption of an
earlier statute by reference makes it as much a part of the
latter as though it had been completely incorporated. Engel
v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 38 (1926). The citizen suit provi-
sion states that "for provisions requiring compliance by the
United States ... see section 7418 of this title." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(e) (West 1993). By referring to the federal facilities
provision, the citizen suit provision incorporated all of that
section, including the limitations on civil penalties, namely
that they only apply to coercive civil penalties. See Depart-
ment of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1642. Because of the reference
to section 118 of CAA, Congress incorporated it into the citi-
zen suit provision and thus limited civil penalties in that sec-
tion to those coercive in nature also.
II. THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE CLAIM BY
SUNPEACE BECAUSE SUNPEACE LACKS
STANDING, AND, ALTERNATIVELY, THE
DISTRICT COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION.
Sunpeace cannot claim a substantive violation of NEPA
because CRACT fully complied with NEPA's requirements.
Sunpeace's claim amounts to the allegation that CRACT
broke an implied promise to do something it was not required
to do. Since CRACT gave full consideration to the environ-
mental consequences of the ICTE project in the FONSI, Sun-
peace cannot claim an injury within the zone of interests
protected by NEPA. Sunpeace thus lacks standing to bring a
claim under NEPA. Even if this Court finds that Sunpeace
does have standing to pursue a claim that CRACT broke an
implied promise to do something it was not required to do,
neither NEPA nor the APA provided the District Court with
subject matter jurisdiction to hear such a claim.
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/3
TWELFTH CIRCUIT
A. Sunpeace lacks standing because it has not suffered an
injury in fact that is within the zone of interests
protected by NEPA.
The Supreme Court has held that "[n]o principle is more
fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of
government than the constitutional limitation of federal-
court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies .... The
concept of standing is part of this limitation." Simon v. East-
ern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976).
Standing is an integral element of the Constitution's Article
III limitation because the limitation prohibits federal courts
from deciding questions that do not affect the rights of the
litigants before them. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494
U.S. 472, 477 (1990). The courts are not free to decide upon
"a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character
... one that is academic or moot." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ha-
worth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937). This requirement "subsists
through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and
appellate." Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477.
The essence of standing is whether a party has a rela-
tionship to the subject matter of a case sufficient under the
adversarial system. Justice Scalia recently summed up the
three essential elements to standing, as defined by the
Supreme Court;
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) con-
crete and particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical." Second, there must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct com-
plained of ... Third, it must be "likely" as opposed to
merely "speculative" that the injury will be "redressed by a
favorable decision."
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2140-41
(1992) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
When a plaintiff brings suit under a regulatory statute
and seeks review according to the APA, the court's attention
is once again directed by section 702, which demands that the
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plaintiff be "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
a relevant statute" 5 U.S.C. § 702 (West 1993). The relevant
inquiry is whether the interest "is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or consti-
tutional guarantee in question." Association of Data Process-
ing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
The zone of interests protected by NEPA is unique in
that the statute mandates procedural rather than substan-
tive action on the part of agencies. The only right conferred
by NEPA is "the procedural right to have environmental im-
pacts considered." City of Los Angeles v. National Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(Ginsburg, Ruth B., J., concurring). Thus, it is the "creation
of a risk that serious environmental impacts will be over-
looked" that establishes an injury in fact under NEPA. Id. at
487.
CRACT considered the environmental consequences of
continued ICTE operation by preparing and filing a complete
EA and FONSI. (T.R. 4.) Sunpeace had the opportunity to
challenge these documents, but it did not do so. These un-
challenged documents stand as adequate and complete
records of the consideration given to possible environmental
impacts stemming from the operation of ICTE. Sunpeace
cannot claim that there is a risk that environmental impacts
will not be considered because neither the EA nor the FONSI
has been challenged. Sunpeace's claimed injury does not fall
within the zone of interest protected by NEPA.
B. Sunpeace lacks standing because its interest in
obtaining review of the voluntary EIS, while sincere,
is not legal and cannot satisfy the Constitutional
requirements of Article III.
The fact that Sunpeace sincerely opposes the operation of
ICTE does not suffice to give them standing, a vital element
of Article iirs "bedrock requirement" for cases and controver-
sies. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982).
The Supreme Court has held that a "mere interest in a prob-
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lem, no matter how long-standing the interest and no matter
how qualified the organization in evaluating the problem, is
not sufficient by itself to render the organization adversely
affected or aggrieved within the meaning of the APA." Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972); see also Valley
Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 ("standing is not measured by the in-
tensity of the litigant's interest or the fervor of his advocacy").
DOI does not dispute the District Court's finding that the
members of Sunpeace have a legitimate interest in the envi-
ronment, which they allege will be affected by ICTE. (T.R. 4.)
However, that fact does not suffice to give them standing.
Sunpeace must not only have a generally cognizable interest,
but also an alleged injury of a kind protected by the statute:
That [the] plaintiff's interests are cognizable generally
under NEPA... does not compel the determination that it
has sustained an injury in fact to maintain [an] action.
[Tihe harm with which courts must be concerned in NEPA
cases is not, strictly speaking, harm to the environment,
but rather the failure of decision-makers to take environ-
mental factors into account in the way that NEPA
mandates.
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. United States
Dep't of the Interior, 439 F. Supp. 762, 766 (D.D.C. 1977).
Sunpeace cannot claim that CRACT failed to take envi-
ronmental factors into account because the adequacy of
neither the EA nor FONSI is being challenged. Sunpeace
may have a cognizable interest, but that does mean that they
have an injury in fact sufficient to establish standing. Sun-
peace does not have standing because its alleged injury does
not fall within the zone of interests protected by NEPA.
The injury in fact requirement does more than just sat-
isfy Article III. It serves to narrow the scope of court holdings
to factual situations where litigants assert relevant injuries
in fact. This allows a court to "decide the case with some con-
fidence that its decision will not pave the way for lawsuits
with some, but not all, of the facts of the case actually decided
by the court." Valley Forge, 454 U.S. 472.
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That a denial of standing in this case might limit the pool
of possible litigants is not a relevant consideration. Such a
view "would convert standing into a requirement that must
be observed only when satisfied." Id. at 489.
Finally, the fact that Sunpeace cannot claim a valid in-
jury in fact under NEPA implicates the doctrine of separation
of powers. When a litigant is without standing, that person is
in effect arguing for the public interest rather than her or
himself.
Whether the courts were to act on their own or at the invi-
tation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury require-
ment ... they would be discarding a principle fundamental
to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third
Branch... "The province of the court... is, solely, to de-
cide on the rights of individuals." Vindicating the public
interest... is the function of the Congress and the Chief
Executive.
Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2163-64 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 170 (1803)). Thus, a court that allows a party
without standing to challenge the action of an executive
agency, encroaches upon the constitutionally protected do-
main of the Executive branch.
Sunpeace cannot claim an injury within the zone of inter-
ests protected by NEPA. Neither the sincerity of Sunpeace's
belief in its position nor the possible effects of denying stand-
ing in this case can alter the inevitable conclusion that Sun-
peace lacks standing. This Court's duty to the integrity of the
judicial system as defined by Article III and indeed to the
structure of our republican government mandates dismissal.
C. The District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
hear Sunpeace's claim because CRACTs prior
compliance with NEPA requirements precludes
Sunpeace's access to NEPA's implied right of
action.
Even if this Court finds that Sunpeace does have stand-
ing, the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
hear Sunpeace's claim. It is well-settled that, "under Art. III,
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Congress alone has the responsibility for determining the ju-
risdiction of the lower federal courts." Mountainbrook Home-
owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Adams, 492 F. Supp. 521, 527 (W.D. S.D.
1979). However,
[NEPA provides no private civil remedy. Notwithstanding
the failure of the Congress to authorize either a public or
private cause of action or to provide a private civil remedy
federal courts all over the country have permitted the
maintenance of court actions filed by private citizens and
parties and have fashioned various remedies which have
been enforced by the courts.
492 F. Supp. at 526.
In order to find such an implied right of action within a
statute, a court must apply the prevailing standard set by the
Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a
statute not expressly providing one, several factors are rel-
evant. First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose es-
pecial benefit the statute was enacted"... that is, does the
statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Sec-
ond, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or deny one?...
Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
... And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally rele-
gated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of
action based solely on federal law?
422 U.S. 66, 77 (1975) (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court subsequently held that "the ultimate
issue is whether Congress intended to create a private right
of action... but the four factors specified in Cort 'remain the
criteria through which this intent is discerned.'" California
v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981) (quoting Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979)).
The first requirement of Cort has been summarized as
follows: "the protection and benefit of the party seeking such
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action must be the primary congressional goal of the statute."
Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta RTA, 644 F.2d 434, 437 (5th Cir.
1981). The primary goal of NEPA is to ensure that considera-
tion of environmental consequences is part of federal decision
making. Id. at 438. However, CRACT's FONSI stands as a
record of the fact that the environmental consequences of
ICTE were considered. Because it cannot claim that environ-
mental impacts were not considered, Sunpeace cannot ap-
proach this Court as a party "for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted." Thus Sunpeace cannot satisfy the first
requirement of Cort.
The second factor is whether there existed on the part of
Congress, either explicitly or implicitly, an intent to create
such a remedy. As stated above, the text of NEPA does not
explicitly provide for a civil remedy of any type. Mountain-
brook, 492 F. Supp. at 526. Courts have regularly found im-
plied rights of action to exist under NEPA. Id. However, for
the reasons stated above, Congress did not mean to imply a
right of action when the interest claimed to be injured is not
the consideration of the enviroiment within the agency's de-
cision-making process. This is clear not only in the opinions
of the courts interpreting NEPA, see Stryker's Bay Neighbor-
hood Council, Inc. v. Karlin, 444 U.S. 223, 228 (1980), but
also in its legislative history. In a report on the proposed
statute, the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
stated that NEPA "would provide all agencies and all Federal
officials with a legislative mandate and a responsibility to
consider the consequences of their actions on the environ-
ment." S. Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
Any civil remedy Congress intended is reserved for those
situations where, as a result of a violation of NEPA, an
agency does not give adequate consideration to the environ-
mental consequences of its actions. CRACT's completed and
unchallenged FONSI forecloses even the possibility that this
occurred.
For the same reasons, the third prong is not satisfied in
this instance. The underlying purpose of NEPA, to ensure
that federal agencies give adequate consideration to the envi-
ronmental consequences of their actions, will not be furthered
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by a suit which does not have that as its goal. The fourth
factor is not applicable since NEPA is a federal statute.
According to the Supreme Court, because the first two
Cort prongs are not satisfied, it is unnecessary to even con-
sider the third and fourth prongs. California, 451 U.S. at
297. "The federal judiciary will not engraft a remedy on a
statute, no matter how salutary, that Congress did not intend
to provide. Here, consideration of the first two Cort factors is
dispositive." Id. The fact that the statute has already been
procedurally complied with and that the substantive goals
have been achieved foreclose the possibility that Congress in-
tended an agency to be subject to such a suit.
D. The District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
hear Sunpeace's claim because the APA does not
provide an independent right of action.
An implied right of action does not exist under NEPA for
Sunpeace's claim. Sunpeace cannot rely on the APA for a
grant of jurisdiction because it does not grant jurisdiction.
The APA "simply provides a process by which agency actions
can be reviewed and does not give a person the right to seek
injunctive or declaratory relief for alleged violations of agency
regulations or of the underlying statute." Carson v. Alv~ord,
487 F. Supp. 1049, 1052 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
The fact that the APA does not of itself provide a right of
action is apparent within the text of the act itself; "A person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5
U.S.C. § 702 (emphasis added). Thus, in order to subject an
agency action to APA review, a party must be able to demon-
strate a legally cognizable injury as a result of agency action
or a violation of the statute sued under. Sunpeace cannot
meet this requirement and is left without a private right of
action authorizing its claim. Therefore, the District Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Sunpeace's claim.
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BECAUSE CRACT'S
VOLUNTARY EIS IS NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW SINCE IT WAS PREPARED AFTER CRACT
HAD FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF NEPA AND IT IS OUTSIDE
THE SCOPE OF NEPA.
When the EA and FONSI that CRACT filed were not
challenged within the specified time period, CRACT had ful-
filled its duties under NEPA. CRACT subsequently produced
a document on a purely voluntary basis which it called an
EIS. The sole purpose of this voluntary document was to
more thoroughly explain the results of the FONSI to the com-
munity of which CRACT is such an integral part. The only
error CRACT may have committed was using the phrase "En-
vironmental Impact Statement" as the title of the voluntary
document. It was not meant to serve as a traditional EIS,
and it was not meant to be subject to judicial review. Legisla-
tive intent and judicial interpretation of NEPA support the
contention that such a document should not be subject to ju-
dicial review.
A. CRACT fully complied with NEPA when it completed
and filed both an Environmental Assessment and a
Finding Of No Significant Impact.
NEPA requires that federal agencies "include in every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment, a detailed statement." 42 U.S.C.
4332(2) (West 1993). This statement is known as an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS). 40 C.F.R. 1502.3 (West
1993). When an agency is unsure as to whether an action will
require an EIS, NEPA requires that it produce an Environ-
mental Assessment (EA). 40 C.F.R. 1501.4(b) (West 1993).
An EA is a "concise public document" that provides "sufficient
evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an
environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant
impact." 40 C.F.R. 1508.9(a)(2) (West 1993). A Finding Of
No Significant Impact (FONSI) explains why an action "will
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not have a significant impact on the environment and for
which an environmental impact statement therefore will not
be prepared." 40 C.F.R. 1508.13 (West 1993).
In the case at bar, CRACT fully complied with the Above
procedures. CRACT prepared both an EA and a FONSI and
then made both available to the public. (T.R. 4.) Sunpeace
concedes that it did not make a timely challenge to the
FONSI. (T.R. 5.) Once the required period for challenging
the FONSI passed, CRACT's responsibilities under NEPA
were fulfilled.
B. Any action taken by CRACT beyond the scope of NEPA
is not reviewable by this Court.
CRACT complied with NEPA when it filed the unchal-
lenged EA and FONSI, so its obligations under NEPA are ful-
filled. This Court cannot require CRACT to do more than
NEPA itself requires.
1. CRACT fulfilled its duty to comply with NEPA's
procedural requirements.
The Supreme Court has held that "once an agency has
made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements,
the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has con-
sidered the environmental consequences." Stryker's Bay, at
227. NEPA thus provides "procedural rather than substan-
tive protection" and dictates only how an agency must act in
considering an action, but not in deciding upon one. Noe, 644
F.2d at 438. "Although the procedural requirements of NEPA
must be satisfied, the courts will require only the 'statutory
minima,' refusing to substitute their judgment for the judg-
ment of the administrative agencies charged with satisfying
the requirements of NEPA." Piedmont Heights Civic Club,
Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430, 436 (5th Cir. 1981).
CRACT had a duty under NEPA to consider the environ-
mental consequences of the operation of ICTE. It did so in
preparing the EA, which led CRACT to the conclusion that
any operation of ICTE that complied with NUCAA standards
would not have a significant impact. (T.R. 4.) Thus CRACT
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fully complied with the duties imposed by NEPA. Any fur-
ther procedural steps by CRACT in relation to this same pro-
posed action are not subject to judicial review.
2. This Court cannot require more from CRACT than
that which is required by NEPA itself.
The primary purpose of NEPA is the "full disclosure of
the environmental consequences of federal governmental ac-
tivities." Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 537
(S.D. Tex. 1972). Thus, it makes sense that once the "statu-
tory minima" is fulfilled, "NEPA requires only that the
agency take a hard look with good faith objectivity at the en-
vironmental consequences of a particular action." Piedmont
Heights, 637 F.2d at 436.
The fact that NEPA requires only the consideration of
environmental consequences is made clear by the refusal of
courts to allow actions under NEPA to enforce substantive
compliance with EIS's. Noe, 644 F.2d at 435. "Plaintiffs do
not have a cause of action, either express or implied, under
the provisions of The National Environmental Policy Act to
compel strict compliance with the Environmental Impact
Statement." Mountainbrook, 492 F. Supp. at 530.
If NEPA cannot even support a claim to enforce substan-
tive compliance with an EIS, it is certainly unable to support
a claim alleging inadequate decision-making procedures
outside the scope of NEPA. Once CRACT submitted its
FONSI, the only recourse available within a court was the
assessment of the EA and FONSI to see if they were the re-
sult of a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of
such an action. However, as Sunpeace concedes, there was
no challenge made to the FONSI within the statutory period
for such a challenge. (T.R. 5.) Thus, the FONSI stands as a
record of adequate consideration of environmental conse-
quences by CRACT, and "NEPA requires no more." Stryker's
Bay, 444 U.S. at 228.
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C. CRACT complied with NEPA in good faith, and it
would be unreasonable to subject the voluntary
document to judicial review.
1. CRACT complied with NEPA in good faith.
Although CRACT had already satisfied its statutory obli-
gations under NEPA, it decided to go further toward making
public the information contained within the FONSI. (T.R. 4.)
CRACT realized that there was some concern within the com-
munity despite the fact that future operation of ICTE would
have no significant environmental impacts. (T.R. 4.) In the
spirit of NEPA, CRACT produced a voluntary EIS to insure
that all relevant information would be "available to public of-
ficials and citizens before decisions [were] made and actions
[were] taken." 40 C.F.R. 1500.1(b) (West 1993).
However, the voluntary document was not meant to
serve as a reconsideration of the FONSI. Such a procedure
would be redundant. Rather, the document was prepared
outside of the scope of NEPA and was meant simply to pro-
vide a further illustration of the two alternatives available to
CRACT, neither of which would impact the environment.
The voluntary document was not an EIS, nor was it a
Supplemental EIS. The only error CRACT may have commit-
ted was in choosing to term this document an "Environmen-
tal Impact Statement." Certainly, CRACT had no intent to
commit a fraud of any kind, nor did CRACT anticipate that
any confusion would arise. To the contrary, the document
was prepared in good faith as an attempt to provide the com-
munity more information regarding the conclusions reached
in preparing the FONSI. At the very least, it is understanda-
ble that CRACT would call the voluntary document an EIS,
since it did contain the assessment of the environmental con-
sequences of available alternatives. (T.R. 4.)
Despite the apparent confusion caused by the voluntary
document's title, its nature was made clear when, in response
to Sunpeace's complaint that the voluntary document was
lacking a no action alternative, CRACT responded that such
a concern was "outside the scope of this EIS and beyond the
requirements of this EIS." (T.R. 4. (emphasis added)) As a
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federal agency, the Department of the Interior is aware that
CEQ regulations require consideration of the no action alter-
native within an EIS. 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(d) (West 1993). The
alternative was not considered, because this was not a formal
EIS.
2. The legislative intent behind NEPA, evident in
CEQ regulations and judicial interpretations,
support the contention that procedures beyond
the scope of NEPA should not be subject to
judicial review.
Requiring review of the voluntary document after
CRACT has already fully complied with NEPA would do
nothing to further NEPA's purpose of consideration of envi-
ronmental consequences. Instead, it would encourage waste,
delay, and inefficiency. Such a result is clearly contrary to
the mandate of NEPA, which "requires only that, prior to be-
ginning construction of a project likely to affect the environ-
ment, an EIS be produced so that the individuals responsible
for making the decision... do so on a well-informed basis."
Noe, 644 F.2d at 438.
NEPA's focus on lack of waste and efficiency is evident in
many sources. The Executive Order which provided for es-
tablishment of the Council on Environmental Quality was
amended in 1978 to insure that regulations "reduce
paperwork and the accumulation of extraneous background
data, in order to focus on the real environmental issues and
alternatives." Exec. Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4,247
(March 7, 1970), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42
Fed. Reg. 26,967 (May 25, 1977).
The actual CEQ regulations make clear that "it is the
Council's intention that any trivial violation of these regula-
tions not give rise to any independent cause of action." 40
C.F.R. 1500.3 (West 1993). The regulations further counsel
against "amassing needless detail" and state that NEPA's
purpose is not "to generate paperwork--even excellent
paperwork-but to foster excellent action." 40 C.F.R.
1500.1(b-c) (West 1993). Indeed, the Council decided to
devote entire sections to "Reducing delay," 40 C.F.R. 1500.5
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(West 1993), and "Reducing paperwork," 40 C.F.R. 1500.4
(West 1993).
Categorical exclusions are another telling example of
how waste and delay is discouraged. CEQ regulations allow
agencies to exempt from NEPA requirements certain actions
which have been found to have no significant impact. 40
C.F.R. 1508.4 (West 1993). Analogous to the CEQ-created
categorical exclusion exception is the judicially-created func-
tional equivalent exception. As an example of the latter, it
has been held that "section 111 of the Clean Air Act, properly
construed, requires the functional equivalent of a NEPA im-
pact statement," thus eliminating the need for production of
an independent EIS. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,
486 F.2d 375, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Both of these exceptions to NEPA reflect a desire that
form not be allowed to devour substance, that waste and de-
lay not be allowed to exist by charading as actual considera-
tion of environmental consequences. CRACT has complied
with NEPA, this Court should require no more.
Holding this voluntary document to judicial review
would serve no reasonable purpose. The FONSI prepared by
CRACT already considered all of the potential environmental
consequences and found that there would be none. (T.R. 4.)
The public (including Sunpeace) had an adequate opportunity
to submit comments and raise challenges to the FONSI and it
failed to do so. If this Court upholds the injunction and al-
lows review of the voluntary EIS, it will necessarily cause de-
lays in the operation of ICTE. Any such delay will result in
tremendous financial losses, not just to the federal govern-
ment, but to the economy of Cathertown as well. To require
compliance with NEPA following the completion of a valid
FONSI would be to mandate an exercise in waste and futility.
In preparing the voluntary document, CRACT simply
took to heart the NEPA directives that the purposes of the
statute be furthered by "all practicable means," 42 U.S.C.
4331(b) (West 1993), and "to the fullest extent possible." 42
U.S.C. 4332 (West 1993). It should not be penalized for doing
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, DOI respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the judgment of the District Court and
hold CRACT to be immune from the civil penalties sought by
New Union. Additionally, DOI respectfully requests that this
Court dismiss Sunpeace's claim for lack of standing, or, alter-
natively, that this Court remand to the District Court with
instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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APPENDIX A
42 U.S.C. § 7418(a). GENERAL COMPLIANCE.
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the ex-
ecutive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Gov-
ernment (1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility,
or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result,
in the discharge of air pollutants, and each officer, agent or
employee thereof, shall be subject to, and comply with, all
Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, adminis-
trative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the
control and abatement of air pollution in the same manner,
and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. The
preceding sentence shall apply (A) to any requirement
whether substantive or procedural (including any record-
keeping or reporting requirement, any requirement respect-
ing permits and any other requirements whatsoever), (B) to
any requirement to pay a fee or charge imposed by any State
or local agency to defray the costs of its air pollution regula-
tory program, (C) to the exercise of any Federal, State, or lo-
cal administrative authority, and (D) to any process and
sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts,
or in any other manner. This subsection shall apply notwith-
standing any immunity of such agencies, officers, agents, or
employees under any law or rule of law. No officer, agent, or
employee of the United States shall be personally liable for
any civil penalty for which he is not otherwise liable.
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